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20 May 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sprague Committee Meetings  
23 and 24 May 1960

REFERENCE: Memorandum to DCI from DDP/SPO, dated  
19 May 1960, Same Subject [redacted]

Executive Reg.

100-3841

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1. This memorandum is for the information of the DCI.
2. Herewith three additional papers which will be discussed at the Committee meeting on Monday.
3. One of these concerns China and has been coordinated with the FE Division of CIA.
4. The second paper concerns Latin America. This paper has not been reviewed in the Agency. I have referred it to Col. King who will let me have his views prior to the meeting on Monday.
5. The third paper deals with the effects of training foreign military personnel and is not of any immediate interest to the Agency.
6. Contrary to my earlier understanding, I gather that Mr. Sprague intends to initiate at least a preliminary discussion of the Soviet bloc paper which was annexed to the referenced memorandum sent to you earlier this morning. We are completing a review of this paper in the DDP over the week-end and will have preliminary comments prior to the meeting Monday morning. I believe that if the paper is in fact discussed that we should withhold any final concurrences pending at least the results of Khrushchev's statements on a German peace treaty and pending an opportunity for review of the paper by the DDI.

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[redacted]  
John A. Bross  
Senior Planning Officer  
O/DDP

Attachments - 3  
cc: DDCI wo/atts ✓

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Executive File

60-4515

19 May 1960

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**

**SUBJECT: Sprague Committee Meetings  
23 and 24 May 1960**

1. This memorandum is for the information of the DCI.
2. I called Mr. Nielsen this afternoon to ask for the proposed agenda for the meetings of the Sprague Committee on 23 and 24 May. He said that the first item on the agenda was a discussion of the recommendation contained in the report on RFE and RL to the effect that VOA broadcasts to Soviet Russia should be increased. There was some discussion at the last meeting of the desirability of increasing unjammed VOA broadcasts and Messrs. Gray and Hare both indicated skepticism as to whether a case for increased VOA broadcasts had actually been made. Since the last meeting there are indications that the Soviets have resumed jamming and, in view of the current political situation, a definitive judgment on the desirability of increasing VOA broadcasts is going to be even more difficult and speculative.
3. In addition to VOA, the agenda includes consideration of a number of staff papers on the following subjects:
  - a. The non-military aspects of certain military programs including the effect of training foreign military personnel in the United States.
  - b. Three geographical papers - (1) Soviet Bloc, (2) China and (3) Latin America.
  - c. Three papers characterized by Mr. Nielsen as minor - (1) The Impact of Labor Activities Abroad, (2) The Impact of Business Abroad and (3) The Impact of Private American Mass Media on Foreign Public Opinion.

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d. Ways of developing greater flexibility in the procedures and funding of mass media controlled by the Government.

4. You will note that the list of papers proposed for discussion includes one on the Soviet bloc. I am attaching a preliminary draft of this paper which, as of two weeks ago, would in all probability, with minor amendments, have been a perfectly acceptable paper. In view of the current international situation, however, it seems to me that any judgment of the validity of the premises of the paper is bound to be at best highly speculative and it seems to me that the Committee can hardly be expected to reach a responsible conclusion with respect to the desirability of spending [redacted]

[redacted] until the situation clarifies. I have urged Mr. Nielsen to postpone consideration of the paper, pointing out that discussion of these recommendations at this particular moment is likely to develop into rather futile debate about the course of future events. I said it would be difficult to secure Mr. Amory's views on the paper prior to the meeting scheduled for May 23rd and that I thought that you would wish to give him an adequate opportunity to consider the paper's conclusions concerning probable political trends and developments. Mr. Nielsen said that he would try to persuade Mr. Sprague to postpone consideration of the paper. He had been previously reluctant to do this because of the effect which a postponement might have on the Committee's schedule. The only alternative paper available for discussion is the one on comparative scientific and technological developments (a copy of a preliminary draft of which was sent to you this morning). Mr. Sprague wished to postpone consideration of this paper until the meeting scheduled for 6 June as Messrs. Jackson and Reed are both interested in the subject and neither will be present for the Committee meetings next week. If consideration of both papers is deferred, the meeting scheduled for 24 May may be cancelled. (In my opinion this would be a very good idea.)

5. Finally, Mr. Nielsen referred to the matter of the U-2. He felt that the Committee could hardly disregard this incident which, in all its ramifications, has obviously had enormous impact on foreign opinion, etc. He said that the concern of the Committee, as he saw it, would not include the wisdom of particular decisions on particular

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aspects of the incident. He felt, however, that the Committee would be justifiably concerned with the question of whether or not there was adequate consultation with officials charged with responsibility for the so-called "P" factor prior to decisions likely to affect or influence foreign attitudes. The Committee's concern would therefore be with the adequacy of the procedures for affording appropriate consultation with public relations officials prior to the formulation of decisions likely to have consequences in terms of public opinion. I told Mr. Nielsen that the whole question of the U-2 incident was obviously highly complex and obviously involved issues of great sensitivity. I suggested that if he wished to raise the matter, he raise it in terms of a question of whether and how the Committee should address itself to this problem. I told him that you would wish personally to participate in any discussion of this question and that I would appreciate his letting me know in advance if the matter were in fact to be introduced for discussion.

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John A. Bross  
Senior Planning Officer  
O/DDP

Attachment  
cc: DDCI wo/att.

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